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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 06/03/2011 Accident number: 681 
Accident time: 10:40 Accident Date: 21/07/2009 





Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 29/09/2009 
ID original source: OPS,14/01-20, Ref: 
09/10/326 
Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: dry/dusty 
hard 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 06/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons 
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be 
revised as more information becomes available. 
The Lessons Learned summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS,14/01-20, Date: September 29, 2009. Ref: 09/10/326 
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] DT# 3 
DEMINING ACCIDENT 
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] DT# 3 
demining accident occurred on 21 July 2009 in Kandahar airport, Daman district of Kandahar 
province.  
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-03 MINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the Deminer of [Demining group] DT-03. The accident occurred at 10:40 
hours on 21 July 2009 at the minefield number 30910965, located in Kandahar Airport, 
Daman district of Kandahar province. 
SUMMARY: 
ME # 309/0965 is an anti-personal mine contaminated site around Kandahar Airbase. During 
the Russian invasion a big security belt of landmine was established by the government 
forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. This minefield is one of the 
minefields covered in the above mentioned large size of contaminated area. 
As the task is located inside Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and as well as the victim is evacuated 
to the coalition force military base hospital. Therefore, due to security consideration of 
coalition forces the investigation team was not allowed to physically observe the accident 
scene and conduct interview with victim deminer. 
According to the statement of team leader, section leader and medical report the findings of 
investigation team are as follows: 
On 21 July 2009 while deminer [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane, investigating a 
detected signal with his hand trowel, he hit a mine on its top and caused it to go off. The 
weather was hot and the ground surface was hard and dry, so it seems that the deminer had 
used his excavation tool by force and carelessly and directly on pinpointed spot so touched 
the top of mine and caused the accident. As the deminer was dressed with PPE (vest, helmet 
and visor according to [Demining group] SOPs), so his face, neck and chest remained safe. 
As he was working in squatting position, so his both legs were injured and also he got fracture 
to his right hand fingers. The injuries to both legs of deminer were preventable if the apron or 
lower limbs covering PPE was used. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
The investigation team concluded that the carelessness of deminer caused the accident. But 
the main element involved in accidents together with other causes is poor supervision. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following points are to be considered: 
a. Hard grounds are to be prepared by machines first and then to be dealt manually. 
b. [Demining group] is recommended to consider lower limb cover in terms of PPE and 
amend their SOP accordingly. 
c. The deminer should not hurry up during the excavation drill, be careful and do not use the 
prodding/excavation tools carelessly. 
d. The team command group should strictly control the deminers during operation and 
immediately stop them while practicing in contrary to standard operating procedures. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 865 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Hands, severe Legs 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that there was “poor supervision”. The secondary cause is listed as 
Inadequate equipment because the hand tool being used by the deminer was too short and 
was not blast resistant (as recommended in the IMAS) and so is likely to have contributed to 
his injury. 
It is bizarre that the deminers were permitted to work in this “security” area but that the 
investigators were not permitted to enter the area to conduct a post-accident investigation. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The presence of the accident summary 
implies that a full and comprehensive accident investigation was made, but not made 
available for others to learn from. 
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